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Abstract
The article analyses how government spending is determined under diﬀer-
ent exchange rate regimes in the context of a small open economy. Assuming
nominal wage contracts which last for one period and assuming a benevolent
government which determines government spending to optimise a representa-
tive individual’s utility, it is demonstrated that there are diﬀerences between
exchange rate regimes with respect to the level of government spending. These
diﬀerences arise first because a rise in government spending aﬀects macroeco-
nomic variables diﬀerently under diﬀerent exchange rate regimes, and second
because the government’s inclination to expand government spending is aﬀected
by inflation which depends on the exchange rate regime. At low rates of inflation,
the government is inclined to set a higher level of government spending under a
fixed exchange rate regime than under a floating exchange rate regime in which
the monetary authority optimises preferences which include an employment tar-
get and an inflation target. As government spending aﬀects the representative
individual’s utility, the choice of exchange rate regime has an impact on welfare.
Keywords: exchange rate regimes; fiscal policy; monetary union; inflation
targeting.
JEL classicification: E42, E61, E62, F33.
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1 Introduction
This article examines in the context of a small open economy the relationship between
on the one side the exchange rate regime and on the other side the design of fiscal policy.
The point of departure is an equilibrium where the interaction between economic
agents is repeated in all time periods. The analysis is based on optimising foundations
and on the presence of a short-term nominal rigidity which takes the form of one-period
nominal wage contracts.1 Fiscal policy is determined by a benevolent government which
optimises a representative individual’s utility. In line with Kydland and Prescott (1977)
and with Barro and Gordon (1983), economic policy decisions are made after nominal
wage contracts have been pre-set at the beginning of the period. The nominal wage is
determined by representative individuals who have full foresight regarding subsequent
policy decisions. Fiscal policy takes the form of decisions on the level of government
spending which is financed through a tax on labour and capital income. There is a
balanced government budget.
The analysis suggests two channels which cause government spending to lie at dif-
ferent levels under diﬀerent exchange rate regimes. First, as the nominal wage is pre-set
through contracts prior to the policy setting, a benevolent government’s inclination to
expand government spending is determined by the eﬀects which government spending
has on macroeconomic variables in an economic framework characterised by nominal
wage rigidity. In such a model based on nominal wage rigidity, there are diﬀerent ef-
fects of government spending on macroeconomic variables under diﬀerent exchange
rate regimes. These diﬀerences with respect to the eﬀects of government spending on
macroeconomic variables mean that the government faces diﬀerent incentives to ex-
pand government spending under diﬀerent exchange rate regimes. As a second channel
which causes government spending to depend on the exchange rate regime, the analysis
points to the eﬀect which government spending has on inflation. A benevolent govern-
ment takes into account how government spending aﬀects the price level. Thus, if there
is a high rate of inflation, fiscal policy is to a larger extent determined by the consider-
ation to reduce inflation than if there is a low inflation. As the inflation rate depends
on the exchange rate regime, it again that a benevolent government faces diﬀerent
incentives to expand government spending under diﬀerent exchange rate regimes.
The first of these two channels - i.e. the impact of the exchange rate regime on
the eﬀect which government spending has on macroeconomic variables given a pre—set
nominal wage - should come as no surprise. It is well-known from fix-price or fix-wage
models of the open economy that the eﬀect of fiscal policy on macroeconomic variables
1This corresponds to the body of theory known as the ’New Open-Economy Macroeconomics’
which analyses short-term nominal rigidities in an economic framework based on optimising founda-
tions. The pioneering contribution is Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995). The early literature is surveyed by
Lane (2001). Most analyses are based on nominal price rigidity. The analyses in Hau (2000) and in
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000, 2002) assume nominal wage contracts.
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depends on the exchange rate regime. Thus, in the standard Mundell-Fleming model
production is unaﬀected by fiscal policy under a floating exchange rate regime while
there is an impact on production under a fixed exchange rate. It is natural that such
diﬀerences between exchange rate regimes with respect to the eﬀects of fiscal policy
on macroeconomic variables have an impact on the incentive to expand government
spending.
The analysis demonstrates that government spending aﬀects a representative indi-
vidual’s utility. This means that welfare lies at diﬀerent levels under diﬀerent exchange
rate regimes. This finding is important because it implies that the exchange rate regime
should be chosen not only from the perspective of lowering inflation and reducing out-
put variability but also from the perspective of bringing about an optimal level of
government spending.2 As the analysis takes its perspective in an equilibrium which
is repeated in all periods, the diﬀerent welfare levels persist in the long term, implying
that the choice of monetary regime has permanent implications for welfare.
Two exchange rate regimes are compared: (i) a floating exchange rate regime where
the monetary authority optimises preferences which include an employment target and
an inflation target, and (ii) a fixed exchange rate regime where the exchange rate is
tied to that of another country with no possibility of exchange rate adjustment. We
refer to the first of these exchange rate regimes as inflation targeting while we refer to
the second of the regimes as a monetary union. It is demonstrated that a benevolent
government at low rates of inflation is inclined to set a higher level of government
spending in the monetary union than under inflation targeting. The converse holds
when inflation lies above a certain level. It is further demonstrated that inflation
targeting is superior to a monetary union seen from a welfare perspective at low rates
of inflation. At low rates of inflation it is thus possible to increase welfare by switching
from a fixed exchange rate to a floating exchange rate regime where monetary policy
is used to pursue an employment target and an inflation target.
The connection between the exchange rate regime and fiscal policy has been a
central issue of discussion in the literature and among policy makers, not least in
connection with the European Monetary Union. The analysis in this article is most
related to Agell, Calmfors and Jonssson (1996) who analyse fiscal policy in a Barro-
Gordon model framework where the nominal wage is pre-set for one time period. There
are three major diﬀerences relative to Agell, Calmfors and Jonsson (1996). First, the
point of departure in this article is a comparison between on the one side a floating
exchange rate regime with inflation targeting and on the other side a monetary union
2The choice of monetary regime in the open economy is usually seen in the context of minimising
output fluctuations and of reducing inflation. Other macroeconomic considerations include the loss
of inflation tax/seignorage and the possibility of providing finance to troubled financial institutions.
At the microeconomic level, the reduction of exchange rate uncertainty and the saving of transaction
costs are usually seen as important elements. Recent discussions are found in Alesina, Barro and
Tenreyo (2002), Frankel (2003), and Tenreyo and Barro (2003).
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while Agell, Calmfors and Jonsson (1996) compare a monetary union to a monetary
regime where the authorities use the exchange rate instrument discretely to optimise
preferences. Second, the diﬀerence with respect to the use of fiscal policy across ex-
change rate regimes is due in Agell, Calmfors and Jonsson (1996) to the possibility
of using exchange rate adjustments as an additional instrument under a fixed-but-
adjustable regime. This channel is diﬀerent from the channels which in this analysis
cause diﬀerences between exchange rate regimes with respect to government spending,
i.e. the diﬀerence between exchange rate regimes concerning the eﬀects of government
spending on macroeconomic variables and the impact of inflation on a benevolent gov-
ernment’s fiscal decisions. A third diﬀerence concerns the model framework. While
fiscal policy in Agell, Calmfors and Jonsson (1996) is determined on the basis of pref-
erences that are specified ad hoc, it is assumed in this analysis that fiscal policy is
determined to optimise a representative individual’s utility.3
A number of studies highlight other factors which may cause diﬀerences with re-
spect to fiscal policy under diﬀerent monetary regimes. The Delors Report argues that
there is an inclination to pursue a more restrictive fiscal policy under a fixed-but-
adjustable exchange rate in order to reduce the risk of currency crises. It is further
discussed in the Delors Report how government behaviour may be influenced by the
expectation that other members in a monetary union will come to the rescue of a
government which experiences diﬃculties with respect to the re-payment of loans.4
Dixit and Lambertini (2001) consider the strategic interaction between monetary and
fiscal policies in a model framework with pre-set prices where production and inflation
are aﬀected by monetary and fiscal policies. In this model set-up, fiscal policy is de-
termined by the exchange rate regime which determines the monetary policy reaction
to shocks.5 Tornell and Velasco (2000) examine how a more restrictive fiscal policy is
pursued under a floating exchange rate regime because a lax fiscal policy under this
regime has immediate negative eﬀects in the form of higher inflation. Several studies
consider the eﬀects which arise for fiscal policy because the authorities in a monetary
union lose the ability to control inflation, thus causing a loss of government revenue
3The analysis in Agell, Calmfors and Jonsson (1996) is based on the assumption of a cost associated
with using fiscal policy. No justification is given for this assumption. The analysis in Ostrup (2000) is
also based on the assumption of an exogenously determined cost associated with deviations of fiscal
policy from its optimal level.
4The Delors Report (Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, 1989) sparked a
large body of literature concerning fiscal policy rules in the European Monetary Union, see e.g. Buiter,
Corsetti and Roubini (1993), Chari and Kehoe (2004), de Grauwe (1990), Eichengreen (1993), Levine
and Brociner (1994), and Masson and Taylor (1992, 1993). The Delors Report has formed the basis
for the provisions on fiscal policy in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and in the Stability and Growth
Pact which was adopted in 1997 as an attempt to prevent countries from pursuing an expansive fiscal
policy after the introduction of the euro.
5See also Dixit (2001).
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from inflation tax/seignorage.6 Other studies analyse how the incentive to pursue an
expansive fiscal policy may change in a monetary union by the creation of a scheme for
fiscal transfers which makes it possible for countries to counter asymmetric shocks.7 It
has finally been demonstrated that there are diﬀerences between exchange rate regimes
with respect to the fiscal policy stance in an economic framework where the price level
is determined to ensure the long-term solvency of governments which issue debt.8
The impact of fiscal policy in a model based on the ’New Open-Economy Macroeco-
nomics’ has previously been studied by Caselli (2001). The analysis in Caselli (2001)
diverges from the analysis in this article in several respects. Most importantly, fiscal
policy is Caselli (2001) is determined exogenously. There is thus no analysis of the
diﬀerent incentives which face the fiscal authorities under diﬀerent monetary regimes.
Section 2 specifies the model. Section 3 derives natural employment. Section 4 dis-
cusses the determination of government spending. Section 5 examines how government
spending is determined under inflation targeting while section 6 considers government
spending in a monetary union. Section 7 compares the two exchange rate regimes.
Section 8 analyses government spending under the two exchange rate regimes relative
to the optimal level. Section 9 gives a summary and a conclusion.
2 The model
The analysis concerns a small open economy. We refer to this economy as the ’home
country’ while the rest of the world is represented by a large economy termed the
’foreign country’. Variables relating to the foreign country are denoted by asterisks
and are exogenous to the analysis. The large foreign economy has a structure which is
6Sibert (1992) finds that the loss of seignorage in a monetary union distorts the choice between
income tax and segnorage due to spill-over eﬀects in other countries. Jensen (1994) suggests that the
natural unemployment may rise in a monetary union because the authorities have to increase the tax
rate on labour income due to the possible loss of inflation tax/seigniorage in the monetary union.
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996) observe that the natural unemployment is unaﬀected by the authorities’
loss of seignorage/inflation tax in a monetary union insofar as seigniorage/inflation tax is a tax on
consumption when money is held prior to consumption expenditure. Beetsma and Bovemberg (1998)
and Cooper and Kempf (2000) analyse the strategic interaction between a common central bank in
a monetary union and the fiscal authorities that arise when part of the budgetary deficit is financed
through seignorage. In the context of a closed-economy, Alesina and Tabellini (1987) analyse the
interaction between monetary and fiscal policies when inflation tax/seignorage aﬀect the authorities’
budgetary constraint.
7Beetsma and Bovenberg (2001) analyse how a monetary union may weaken the incentive of
national policy makers to bring about fiscal discpline because a monetary union may lead to the
establishment of fiscal transfer schemes to alleviate the costs for single countries associated with
asymmetric shocks. The Delors Report argues that fiscal policy may be laxer in a monetary union
because it may be expected in a monetary union that other participants will bail out a country in
payments diﬃculties.
8See Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001).
5
similar to that of the small country except for size. We consider, to simplify, a single
time period. Time indications are deleted.
Decisions concerning economic variables are made by four types of agents: (i) a rep-
resentative firm which optimises profit under perfect competition, (ii) a representative
individual who optimises utility, (iii) the government which makes fiscal decisions, and
(iv) the monetary authority which controls monetary policy. The representative firm
and the representative individual operate at the microeconomic level, taking prices and
economic policy variables as given in their optimisation, while the authorities operate
at the macroeconomic level.
A distinction is made between on the one side private consumption and on the
other side public consumption. Both private and public consumption bring utility to
the representative individual. Private consumption consists of those goods which the
individual purchases directly from firms. Public consumption consists of goods - e.g.
education and welfare services - which are bought by the government from firms and
which are placed at the free disposal of the individuals. The size of public consumption
is decided by the government.
At the beginning of the period, the nominal wage is pre-set through a contract
between individuals and firms. The nominal wage is set at such a level that it brings
about equilibrium on the labour market in the course of the contract period.9 Sub-
sequently, in the course of the time period and on the basis of the pre-set nominal
wage, the firm makes decisions on employment and production while the individual
determines the private consumption of home country and foreign goods and the size of
money balances. Also subsequent to the wage setting, the government decides on gov-
ernment spending while the monetary authority determines the money supply. Under
the floating exchange rate regime, the monetary authority adjusts the money supply
to optimise preferences which include an employment goal and a goal of price stability
while in a monetary union the money supply is adjusted to maintain the fixed exchange
rate.
Firms operate in competitive markets. The representative firm uses the labour
input to produce a good which can be used both for private and public consumption.
The production function is
(1) Y = Lα, 1 > α > 0,
where Y is production, and L labour. α is the output elasticity with respect to labour.
The firm optimises profit given the production function specified by (1). It results
that production is negatively aﬀected by a rise in the real wage, determined as the
9It is not important to the conclusions in the analysis whether the nominal wage is determined
by the representative individual, by the firm, or as the level which brings about equilibrium between
demand and supply in the labour market. To simplify, the latter assumption has been used in the
analysis.
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nominal wage divided by the producer price. The condition for the firm’s optimisation
with respect to labour is
(2) y = −
µ
α
1− α
¶
(w − p) +
µ
α
1− α
¶
log(α),
where w is the nominal wage (logarithmic value), and p the producer price (logarithmic
value). y is the log of production Y.
A representative individual derives utility from the private consumption of goods
produced in the home country and in the foreign country. In addition, the individual
derives utility from public consumption, consisting of goods which are placed at the
individual’s free disposal by the government, cf. above. There is further utility from
real money balances while there is disutility from work and from a rise in consumer
prices. The individual’s utility is
U = log(C) + ϑ log(G) + ρ log
µ
M
P
¶
− κ
ν
Lν − 1
2
χπ2,(3)
C ≡
h
(1− ϕ) 1θH θ−1θ + ϕ 1θF θ−1θ
i θ
θ−1
, π ≡ pC − pC−1, pC−1 ≡ 0,
ϑ > 0, ρ > 0, κ > 0, ν > 1, χ > 0, 0 < ϕ < 1, θ > 1,
where U is the representative individual’s utility, C an index which represents the
individual’s private consumption of home country and foreign goods, G public con-
sumption,M money balances, π inflation, defined as the rise in consumer prices, H the
private consumption of goods produced in the home country, F the private consump-
tion of goods produced in the foreign country, and pC the consumer price (logarithmic
value). The parameter ϑ represents the utility of public consumption, ρ the utility from
real money balances, κ and ν the disutility from work, and χ the disutility associated
with inflation. θ is the elasticity of substitution across diﬀerent goods in private con-
sumption. ϕ reflects the utility of foreign goods relative to home country goods. pC−1
is the consumer price in the previous period, normalised at zero (logarithmic value).
P is the non-logarithmic level of p.
The individual receives income from work and from dividends. Dividends are dis-
tributed lump-sum with an equal amount to each individual. Labour income and div-
idends are taxed at the same rate. The real cost associated with money balances is
equal to inflation. In order to abstract from the eﬀects of inflation tax/seignorage, it
is assumed that the individual receives a lump-sum transfer payment from the govern-
ment which compensates for the real cost of money balances. This gives the budget
constraint as
W
P
L(1− τ) + ψ(1− τ) +' = H +XF + πM
P
,(4)
' = π
M
P
, ψ = Y − W
P
L, X ≡ SP
∗
P
, 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1,
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where τ is the tax rate on labour income and dividends, ψ dividends, ' a lump-sum
transfer from the government, X the real exchange rate, defined as the price level of
foreign goods relative to home country goods expressed in the home country currency,
and S the nominal exchange rate (number of domestic currency units per foreign
currency unit). W is the non-logarithmic value of the nominal wage. P ∗ is the price
on foreign goods.
The representative individual optimises (3) under the constraint of (4) with respect
to the private consumption of home country goods H and of foreign goods F , with
respect to employment L, and with respect to money balances M . This gives:
H =
1− ϕ
1− ϕ+ ϕX1−θQ, Q ≡ H +XF,(5)
F =
ϕX−θ
1− ϕ+ ϕX1−θQ,(6)
L =
µ
1
κ
¶ 1
ν−1
µ
1
Q
¶ 1
ν−1
µ
W
P
¶ 1
ν−1
(1− τ) 1ν−1 ,(7)
M
P
= Q
³ρ
π
´
,(8)
whereQ is real private consumption expenditure, defined as the expenditure for private
consumption deflated by the price on home country goods.
Equations (5) and (6) represent the individual’s demand for respectively home
goods and foreign goods used for private consumption. These demands are functions
of the real exchange rateX and of real private consumption expenditureQ. (7) specifies
the labour supply as a function of private consumption expenditure Q and of the real
after-tax wage income (W/P )(1− τ). (8) gives the demand for real money balances as
a function of real private consumption expenditure Q and of inflation π.
The consumer price is defined as the smallest expenditure which buys one unit of
utility. Given the specification of utility shown by (3), the consumer price is
(9) PC = P
£
1− ϕ+ ϕX1−θ
¤ 1
1−θ ,
where PC is the non-logarithmic value of the consumer price.
There is equilibrium on the government budget. All government spending is used
for public consumption. It is assumed that public consumption consists exclusively
of goods produced in the home country. As lump-sum transfers from the government
equal the real cost related to money balances, equilibrium on the government budget
implies that revenue from the taxation of labour and dividends is equal to government
spending
(10) g = τ , g ≡ G
Y
,
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where g shows government spending relative to production.
Combining the individual’s budget constraint (4) with the demand for home coun-
try and foreign goods shown by respectively (5) and (6) and with the condition for
government budget balance (10), gives real private consumption expenditure as
(11) Q = (1− g)Y.
It follows from (11) that real private consumption expenditure is equal to production
with the deduction of government spending.
There is equilibrium on the market for goods produced in the home country. The
condition for goods market equilibrium is
(12) Y = Z ≡ H + gY + F ∗,
where Z is the demand for goods produced in the home country, and F ∗ is the foreign
demand for home country goods.
Equation (12) shows the demand for home country goods, represented by Z, as
being equal to (i) the demand for home country goods originating from private con-
sumption in the home country, represented by H, (ii) public consumption, shown by
gY , and (iii) the demand for home country goods from the foreign country, given by
F ∗.
The individuals in the foreign economy have preferences which correspond to those
of the individuals in the home country, shown by (3), except for those changes in para-
meter values which result from the larger size of the foreign economy. Correspondingly,
foreign firms have the same structure as home country firms and the foreign authorities
have the same incentives to set policy instruments as the home country authorities.
Using this, the foreign demand for home country goods can be found by analogy to
(6) as
(13) F ∗ =
ϕ∗Xθ
1− ϕ∗ + ϕ∗X−(1−θ)Q
∗, ϕ∗ =
1
N
ϕ, Q∗ = NQ,
where Q∗ is foreign real private consumption expenditure, and ϕ∗ the preference for
imported goods relative to non-imported goods in the foreign economy. N is the size
of the foreign economy relative to the home economy. It follows from the assumption
of a small open economy that N is large, implying that 1/N ∼ 0.
Combining (5) with (11)-(13), the condition for goods market equilibrium can be
written as
(14) Y = Z ≡ 1− ϕ
1− ϕ+ ϕX1−θQ+ gY +
ϕ∗Xθ
1− ϕ∗ + ϕ∗Xθ−1Q
∗.
The first term on the right-hand side of (14) represents the demand for home country
goods which derives from private consumption in the home country while the second
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term is the demand for home country goods which originates from public consumption
in the home country. The third term on the right-hand side of (14) is the demand for
home country goods that originates from private consumption in the foreign economy.
It follows that the demand for home country goods is a function of (i) real private
consumption expenditure in the home country and in the foreign country, (ii) home
country government spending, and (iii) the real exchange rate.
Combining (14) with (11), and further using the assumption that the structure of
the foreign economy is similar to the structure of the home economy except for size,
the condition for goods market equilibrium expressed by (14) can be written as10
y = z = z(y, x, g),(15)
zy ≡
∂z
∂y
= 1− ϕ(1− g), 0 < zy < 1,
zx ≡
∂z
∂x
= ϕ(1− g)A > 0, A ≡ θ + (θ − 1)(1− ϕ) > 1,
zg ≡
∂z
∂g
= ϕ > 0,
where A is a term. zy, zx, and zg represent the demand elasticities with respect to
respectively production, the real exchange rate, and government spending relative to
production. z is the log of Z while x is the log of X.
It follows from (15) that the demand for home country goods is increased by (i) a
rise in production y, (ii) a real depreciation, represented by a rise in x, and (iii) a rise
in government spending relative to production g. A rise in production increases the
demand for domestic goods because it increases real private consumption expenditure
and public consumption. A real depreciation makes home country goods cheaper rela-
tive to foreign goods, thus inducing individuals to increase the private consumption of
home goods relative to foreign goods. Finally, a rise in government spending relative to
production increases the demand for home country goods because public consumption
consists only of home country goods while private consumption consists of both home
goods and foreign goods.
Combining (8) with (10) and (11) gives the condition for equilibrium in the money
10The derivation of demand elasticities can explained as follows. In the case where the economies
are uniform except for size, it follows that X = 1. Using this we derive from (11) and (12):
(∂z/∂y) = (∂z/∂Z)(∂Z/∂Y )(∂Y/y) = (Y/Z)(∂Z/∂Y ) = (∂Z/∂Y ). We further have: (∂Z/∂Y ) =
(1 − ϕ)(1 − g) + g. It similarly follows that (∂z/∂g) = (∂z/∂Z)(∂Z/∂g) = (1/Y )(∂Z/∂g). The
term (∂Z/∂g) = (1 − ϕ)(−Y ) + Y. We have finally got: (∂Z/∂X) = (1 − ϕ)ϕ(θ − 1)(1 − g)Y +
θϕ∗Y ∗(1− g∗)− ϕ∗Q∗(1− g∗)ϕ∗(θ − 1). Assuming that the foreign economy is N times larger than
the domestic economy and has a similar economic structure, it follows that ϕ∗ = 1
N
ϕ while Q∗ =
NQ, implying that ϕ∗Q∗ = ϕQ = ϕY (1 − g). When N is large, it results that the last term in
∂Z/∂X is approximately equal to 0 . We finally use in the derivation that zx = (X/Y )(∂Z/∂X) =
(1/Y )(∂Z/∂X).
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market as
(16) m = p+ y + log(1− g) + log(ρ)− log(π),
where m is the log of money balances M .
It follows from (16) that the money demand is determined by the price on home
country goods, production, government spending relative to production, and by infla-
tion which represents the opportunity cost associated with money balances.
3 The natural employment
At the beginning of the period, the nominal wage is set through a contract at such a
level that the demand for labour equals the labour supply in the course of the contract
period. Individuals and firms have perfect foresight concerning the subsequent policy
setting when the nominal wage is determined. We refer to the employment which
is realised in the course of the wage contract period, as the natural employment.
Combining the production function (1) and the firm’s labour demand given by (2) with
the condition for the individual’s supply of labour shown by (7) and the specification
of real private consumption expenditure (11), we derive
(17) L = L0 =
³α
κ
´ 1
ν
,
where L0 is the natural level of employment, defined as the employment level which is
realised in the course of the wage contract period.
It follows from (17) that natural employment is determined only by the economic
structure, being unaﬀected by economic policies.11
4 The fiscal regime
We consider a benevolent government which determines government spending to op-
timise the representative individual’s utility given by (3). To simplify, we assume that
the government in its optimisation neglects the utility derived from real money bal-
ances.12 Government spending is thus determined to optimise
(18) V g = log(C) + ϑ log(G)− κ
ν
Lν − χ
2
π2,
11This results from the logarithmic specification of the utility which the representative individual
derives from private consumption. In the case where an assumption is made of non-logarithmic utility,
the natural employment is aﬀected by the tax rate and thus by government spending relative to
production.
12This is in line with the ’New Open-Economy Macroeconomics’ literature based on Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ (1995).
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where V g expresses the government’s preferences.
Combining (18) with (3), (5)-(6), and (10)-(11), the government’s preferences can
be expressed as
(19) V g = (1+ϑ)y+ log(1− g)+ 1
θ − 1 log
¡
1− ϕ+ ϕX1−θ
¢
+ϑ log(g)− κ
ν
Lν − χ
2
π2.
The preferences shown by (19) are optimised with respect to government spending
relative to production, represented by g. In the optimisation we use the definition of
the consumer price given by (9). We further use that X = 1 in the case of countries
with uniform structures except for size. This gives the condition for the setting of
government spending as
∂V g
∂g
= − 1
1− g + ϑ
1
g
+
µ
∂y
∂g
¶h
1 + ϑ− κ
α
Lν
i
− ϕ
µ
∂x
∂g
¶
− χπ
µ
∂pC
∂g
¶
= 0,(20) µ
∂pC
∂g
¶
=
µ
∂p
∂g
¶
+ ϕ
µ
∂x
∂g
¶
.
Equation (20) expresses that the government expands government spending until the
point where the marginal utility from a further rise falls to zero. The terms in ∂V g/∂g
reflect the eﬀects on marginal utility which arise from an increase in government spend-
ing. The first term in ∂V g/∂g shows the reduction in utility which results because a
rise in government spending reduces private consumption. The second term in ∂V g/∂g
reflects the increase in utility which follows because a rise in government spending in-
creases public consumption. The third term in ∂V g/∂g reflects the change in utility
which results when government spending aﬀects production, a rise in production creat-
ing more room for private and public consumption but raising the disutility associated
with work. The fourth term in ∂V g/∂g shows how a rise in government spending af-
fects marginal utility through an impact on the real exchange rate, a real appreciation
(reflected by a reduction in x) increasing the purchasing power of home country in-
dividuals with respect to foreign goods. Finally, the fifth term in ∂V g/∂g reflects the
impact of government spending on inflation. A change in government spending aﬀects
the consumer price through an impact on the producer price and on the real exchange
rate, a real appreciation causing a reduction in the domestic price level relative to the
foreign price level and thus tending to reduce the consumer price.
It follows from the condition for the labour supply given by (17) that (κ/α)Lν = 1.
Combining (20) with (17), the condition for the setting of government spending can
be specified as
g = ϑ
µ
1
1 + ϑ−Ψ
¶
,(21)
Ψ ≡
µ
∂y
∂g
¶
(1− g)− χπ
µ
∂p
∂g
¶
(1− g)− ϕ(1 + χπ)(1− g)
µ
∂x
∂g
¶
,
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where Ψ is a function which depends on the eﬀects of government spending on macro-
economic variables and on inflation.
Equation (21) gives the condition for the determination of government spending.
The function Ψ represents the eﬀects which a given change in government spending has
on macroeconomic variables. It follows from (21) that government spending relative
to production is increased when there is a rise in Ψ. The first term in Ψ shows how
a given change in government spending aﬀects marginal utility through an impact on
production. The second and third terms in Ψ reflect how government spending aﬀects
marginal utility through an impact on the producer price and on the real exchange
rate. It follows that Ψ is aﬀected by the rate of inflation.
The government acts on the basis of the pre-set nominal wage when it deter-
mines government spending. Given a pre-set nominal wage, equation (2) specifies
a relationship between on the one side production and on the other side the price
on home country goods. It follows from (2) that ∂p/∂g = [(1 − α)/α](∂y/∂g). It
further results from the goods market equilibrium shown by (15) that ∂x/∂g =
[(1 − zy)/zx](∂y/∂g) − (zg/zx) = (1/A)(∂y/∂g) − (1/A)(1 − g)−1. Using this in (21)
gives
g = ϑ
µ
1
1 + ϑ−Ψ
¶
, Ψ ≡ ϑB +
³ϕ
A
´
− χπD,(22)
B ≡
µ
∂y
∂g
¶
(1− g), D ≡
µ
∂pC
∂g
¶
= B
·µ
1− α
α
¶
+
³ϕ
A
´¸
−
³ϕ
A
´
,
where B and D express the eﬀects of government spending on respectively production
and the consumer price.
Equation (22) shows government spending to depend on three factors: (i) the im-
pact of government spending on production, reflected by ∂y/∂g and thus by B, (ii)
the rate of inflation π, and (iii) the impact of government spending on inflation, rep-
resented by D which again is determined by B and thus by the impact of government
spending on production (∂y/∂g).
The condition for the determination of government spending shown by (22) is
central in the analysis. It is demonstrated below that the exchange rate regime aﬀects
(22) - and thus government spending relative to production - through two channels.
First, as the government acts on the basis of a pre-set nominal wage, the exchange
rate regime determines the impact which a given rise in government spending has on
production. Second, the exchange rate regime determines the inflation rate.
5 Government spending under inflation targeting
We consider in this section a floating exchange rate regime where monetary policy
is used to optimise preferences which include an employment target and an inflation
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target. In line with the literature, the monetary authority’s preferences are specified
as
(23) V m = −1
2
(l − l00)2 − 1
2
χmπ2, χm > 0, l00 − l0 ≡ h > 0, h = h¯,
where l00 expresses the monetary authority’s desired employment level (logarithmic
value), and χm is the weight which the monetary authority attaches to inflation. h
expresses the diﬀerence between the employment which is desired by the monetary
authority and the natural employment. l and l0 show the logarithmic values of respec-
tively employment and natural employment.
It follows from (23) that the monetary authority desires to reach an employment
level, shown by l00, which is higher than the natural level. It further follows that the
monetary authority wants to reduce inflation.
The preferences shown by (23) are optimised after the nominal wage has been pre-
set through contracts. The monetary authority thus acts on the basis of an equation
system which is given by (2) and (15) and by the money market equilibrium which is
specified by (16). Combining (2), (15), and (16) gives the condition for the monetary
authority’s optimisation as
(24) πIT = −(l − l00)
µ
1
αχm
¶·
1− α
α
+
ϕ
A
¸−1
> 0,
where the superscript IT denotes inflation targeting.
Equation (24) represents the monetary authority’s reaction function under inflation
targeting. Inflation - reflected by the rise in consumer prices - is a negative function
of employment. A rise in the weight attached to inflation, expressed by an increase in
χm, lowers inflation at each given level of employment. The money supply is adjusted
so that (24) is met.
The government knows that the monetary authority acts on the basis of the reac-
tion function shown by (24) which represents a relationship between on the one side
the consumer price and on the other side employment. As the consumer price is a
function of the price on home country goods and of the real exchange rate, cf. (9),
and as employment is a function of production, cf. (1), it follows that (24) represents
a relationship between (i) production, (ii) the price on home country goods, and (iii)
the real exchange rate. Given the pre-set nominal wage, the government thus acts on
the basis of an equation system which consists of (2), (15), and (24). This equation
system determines production, the price on home country goods, and the real exchange
rate. Combining (22) with (2), (15), and (24) it results that government spending is
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determined as
gIT = ϑ
µ
1
1 + ϑ−ΨIT
¶
, ΨIT ≡ ϑBIT +
³ϕ
A
´
− χπITDIT ,(25)
BIT ≡
µ
∂y
∂g
¶IT ¡
1− gIT
¢
=
³ϕ
A
´µ1− α
α
+
ϕ
A
¶"µ
1− α
α
+
ϕ
A
¶2
+
µ
1
χm
¶µ
1
α
¶2#−1
> 0,
DIT ≡
µ
∂pC
∂g
¶IT
= BIT
µ
1− α
α
+
ϕ
A
¶
−
³ϕ
A
´
< 0.
It follows from (25) that a rise in government spending increases production and
reduces the level of consumer prices. This can be explained as follows. It follows from
the relationship for goods market equilibrium given by (15) that a rise in government
spending raises the demand for home country goods and thus works to create a real
appreciation, the price on domestic goods being lowered relative to the price of foreign
goods expressed in the same currency. This real appreciation tends to reduce the
consumer price. Given the monetary authority’s reaction function shown by (24), this
reduction in the level of consumer prices creates more room for the monetary authority
to pursue an expansive monetary policy which raises employment and production. A
rise in government spending thus increases production.
As firms and individuals have perfect foresight concerning the authorities’ policy
setting during the wage contract period, employment lies at the natural level. It thus
results from (24) in combination with (23) that inflation under inflation targeting is
determined as
(26) πIT =
µ
1
χm
¶µ
h
α
¶·µ
1− α
α
¶
+
³ϕ
A
´¸−1
> 0.
Equation (26) shows inflation to be determined by the economic structure and by the
monetary authority’s preferences, reflected by h and χm. Government spending has
no eﬀect on inflation.13
6 Government spending in a monetary union
In a monetary union, the nominal exchange rate lies at an unchanged level in each
time period. The money supply is adjusted to maintain the nominal exchange rate.
This gives the following constraint on monetary policy:
(27) S = S.
13This determination of inflation corresponds to Rogoﬀ (1985).
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As individuals set the nominal wage to reach an exogenously determined natural em-
ployment, cf. (17), it results that inflation in the home country is equal to inflation in
the foreign country against which the country ties its currency. This gives
(28) πMU = π∗,
where the superscript MU denotes a monetary union.
The government determines government spending on the basis of the pre-set nom-
inal wage. Given a pre-set nominal wage and using the assumption of a fixed nominal
exchange rate shown by (27), the level of production and the price level on home
country goods are determined by the condition for the firms’ optimisation with re-
spect to labour (2) and by the condition for goods market equilibrium expressed by
(15). Combining (22) with (2), (15), and (27) government spending is thus determined
as
gMU = ϑ
µ
1
1 + ϑ−ΨMU
¶
, ΨMU = ϑBMU +
³ϕ
A
´
− χπ∗DMU ,(29)
BMU ≡
µ
∂y
∂g
¶MU ¡
1− gMU
¢
=
·
1 +A
µ
1− α
α
¶¸−1
> 0,
DMU ≡
µ
∂pC
∂g
¶MU
= BMU
µ
1− α
α
+
ϕ
A
¶
−
³ϕ
A
´
> 0.
It results from (29) that a rise in government spending in a monetary union increases
production and the consumer price.
7 Eﬀects of exchange rate regimes on government
spending
Two exchange rate regimes have been analysed: (i) a floating exchange rate regime
where monetary policy is used to optimise preferences that include an employment
target and an inflation target, and (ii) a monetary union with a fixed exchange rate
relative to a foreign country. Equations (25) and (29) express how government spending
relative to production - and thus also the tax rate - is determined under these two
exchange rate regimes. It results that government spending lies at diﬀerent levels,
reflected by the diﬀerent conditions specified by (25) and (29).
Two factors account for the diﬀerence between exchange rate regimes concerning
the size of the government budget.
First, there are diﬀerences between exchange rate regimes with respect to the im-
pact of government spending on the macroeconomic variables which aﬀect the individ-
uals’ utility, i.e. production, the price on home country goods, and the real exchange
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rate, when the government acts on the basis of a pre-set nominal wage. Under the
floating exchange rate, the eﬀect of government spending on macroeconomic variables
is determined on the basis of the goods supply function (2), the goods market equilib-
rium specified by (15), and the monetary authority’s reaction function given by (24).
In a monetary union the eﬀect of government spending on macroeconomic variables is
determined by the condition of the fixed nominal exchange rate relative to the foreign
country - represented by (27) - together with the goods supply function (2) and the
goods market equilibrium specified by (15).
Second, the rate of inflation aﬀects fiscal decisions. As there are diﬀerences between
exchange rate regimes with respect to the rate of inflation, this also creates diﬀerences
with respect to the government’s inclination to expand government spending. Under
inflation targeting, inflation is determined by the economic structure and by the mon-
etary authority’s preferences corresponding to (26) while inflation in a monetary union
equals inflation in the country against which the country ties its currency, correspond-
ing to (28).
Comparing the eﬀects of government spending on production under the two regimes,
it results from (25) and (29) that
(30) BMU ≡
µ
∂y
∂g
¶MU ¡
1− gMU
¢
> BIT ≡
µ
∂y
∂g
¶IT ¡
1− gIT
¢
.
It follows from (30) that government spending has a larger eﬀect on production in
a monetary union than under inflation targeting. This conclusion is similar to the
standard Mundell-Fleming model where a more expansive fiscal policy in a monetary
union has a larger eﬀect on production in a monetary union than under a floating
exchange rate regime.
Using (30) in (25) and (29), it follows that ΨMU > ΨIT when inflation is lower
than (ϑ/χ){(ϕ/A) + [(1 − α)/α]}. The converse holds when inflation is higher than
(ϑ/χ){(ϕ/A) + [(1− α)/α]}. This gives
gMU > gIT , if πz > πIT , ∧ πz > πMU ,(31)
gIT > gMU , if πIT > πz, ∧ πMU > πz,
πz ≡
µ
ϑ
χ
¶·µ
1− α
α
¶
+
³ϕ
A
´¸
,
where πz is a specific inflation rate.
It results from (31) that the government for relatively low levels of inflation - i.e.
inflation rates lying below πz - is inclined to set a higher level of government spending
in a monetary union than under inflation targeting. The converse holds when inflation
rises above πz. The reason for this is first that a given rise in government spending has
a stronger impact on production in a monetary union than under inflation targeting, cf.
(30), and second that government spending aﬀects the consumer price diﬀerently under
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the two regimes. Under inflation targeting, it is possible through a rise in government
spending to reduce the consumer price while in a monetary union a rise in government
spending raises the consumer price. A higher inflation under inflation targeting thus
creates an incentive for the government to expand government spending while higher
inflation in a monetary union strengthens the incentive to reduce government spending.
8 Welfare implications
It results from the analysis above that there are diﬀerent levels of government spending
- and thus diﬀerent tax rates - under diﬀerent exchange rate regimes. This has welfare
implications as government spending and taxation aﬀect the representative individual’s
utility.
The optimal government spending is realised when the government is able to pre-
commit, implying that it can make decisions on government spending prior to the wage
setting. It follows from (17) that government spending has no eﬀect on employment
which lies at the natural level. It further results from (26) and (28) that government
spending has no impact on inflation. It is, however, possible through an expansion of
government spending to reach a real appreciation which increases welfare due to a rise
in the purchasing power for home country individuals relative to foreign individuals.
The optimal setting of government spending is thus determined on the basis of the
condition specified by (21) where ∂y/∂g = 0 while π = 0. This gives the condition for
the optimal government spending as
(32) g00 ≡ ϑ 1
1 + ϑ−Ψ00 , Ψ
00
=
ϕ
A
,
where g00 is the optimal level of government spending relative to production.
It follows from the condition for the setting of government spending under inflation
targeting - specified by (25) - that ΨIT > Ψ00 = (ϕ/A) for all non-negative rates of
inflation. This means that government spending under inflation targeting lies at a
higher level than the optimal level for all rates of inflation, i.e.
(33) gIT > g00.
It results from (25) that government spending under inflation targeting is increased
when there is a higher inflation. A rise in inflation thus moves government spending
away from the optimal level under inflation targeting. This means that reforms which
increase the weight attached by the monetary authority to inflation, e.g. the creation
of an independent central bank or the appointment of conservative central bankers,
work to improve welfare not only due to the resulting reduction in inflation but also
because government spending is brought closer to the optimal level.
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In a monetary union, we derive from (29) and (32) the following relationship be-
tween government spending and optimal government spending:
gMU > g00, if
µ
ϑ
χ
¶µ
1− α
α
¶
(1− ϕ) > π∗,(34)
gMU = g00, if
µ
ϑ
χ
¶µ
1− α
α
¶
(1− ϕ) = π∗,
gMU < g00, if
µ
ϑ
χ
¶µ
1− α
α
¶
(1− ϕ) < π∗.
It results from (34) that government spending in a monetary union at low rates of
inflation is too high relative to the optimal level. A higher inflation induces, however,
the government to reduce government spending, cf. (29). Below a certain level of
inflation, a higher inflation thus brings government spending closer to the optimal
level. Above this level of inflation, government spending is lower than the optimal
level.
The authorities thus face a trade-oﬀ when they design the institutional set-up
in a monetary union. Up to a certain level, a higher inflation increases welfare seen
from the perspective of bringing government spending closer to the optimal level. The
policymakers should weigh this positive eﬀect arising from higher inflation against the
negative eﬀect on welfare which results because inflation by itself reduces welfare, e.g.
due to an increase in shopping time and a rise in information costs.
As government spending lies at a lower level under inflation targeting than in a
monetary union at rates of inflation below πz, cf. (31), it is possible at relatively low
rates of inflation - inflation being below πz - to increase welfare by switching from a
monetary union to inflation targeting if the same inflation can be maintained under
the two regimes.
9 Summary and conclusion
Using an economic framework based on optimising foundations and making the as-
sumption of nominal wages which are pre-set through contracts for one period, the
article has examined how the exchange rate regime aﬀects government spending. As-
suming a balanced government budget, decisions on government spending - and thus
on taxation - are made by a benevolent government which optimises a representative
individual’s utility. Decisions on government spending are made subsequent to the
wage setting. Two exchange rate regimes have been examined: (i) inflation targeting,
defined as a floating exchange rate regime where the monetary authority optimises
preferences which include an employment target and an inflation target, and (ii) a
monetary union where the exchange rate is tied to that of another country with no
possibility of adjustment. It has been demonstrated that the exchange rate regime
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aﬀects government spending through two channels. First, as the government acts on
the basis of a pre-set nominal wage, the exchange rate regime determines how a change
in government spending aﬀects macroeconomic variables. Second, the exchange rate
regime determines the rate of inflation which in turn aﬀects the government’s inclina-
tion to expand government spending because changes in government spending can be
used to reduce inflation. It has been demonstrated that the government at low rates of
inflation is inclined to set a higher level of government spending in a monetary union
than under a floating exchange rate regime. This is because a given rise in govern-
ment spending has a bigger impact on production in a monetary union than under
inflation targeting. It has further been demonstrated that welfare for low rates of in-
flation is higher under inflation targeting than in a monetary union due to the lower
level of government spending. A rise in inflation induces the government to increase
government spending under inflation targeting while government spending is reduced
by higher inflation in a monetary union. With a rise in inflation, a monetary union
thus becomes more attractive relative to inflation targeting as government spending is
brought closer to its optimal level in a monetary union while it is distanced from the
optimal level under inflation targeting.
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